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ALL RISE!  
STANDING IN JUDGE BETTY FLETCHER’S COURT 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.* 
Abstract: In this essay, based on a talk given at the Washington Law Review’s March 
2009 symposium in honor of Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher and her three 
decades of service on that court, I selectively survey her opinions on justiciability issues: 
standing, ripeness, mootness, and political questions. A significant starting point for this 
survey is Professor Richard Pierce’s 1999 law review article, Is Standing Law or Politics?, 
arguing that many Supreme Court votes in standing cases generally, and appellate judges’ 
votes in environmental-standing cases specifically, can be explained better on the basis of 
politics than by reference to supposedly governing doctrine. Based on the findings reported 
in Pierce’s article, one might expect to find Ninth Circuit judges splitting along predictable 
ideological lines. In this brief survey, I find that some Ninth Circuit panels on which Judge 
Fletcher has sat do split along ideological lines, but that most are unanimous in their 
justiciability rulings even when the panels are ideologically mixed—and one finds variations, 
such as splits among judges appointed by Democratic Presidents and generally regarded as 
“liberal.” Another possible tendency would be for judges to find justiciability when they 
might be expected to be favorably disposed to the substantive claim on the merits, and to 
avoid reaching the merits of what might be unappealing claims. Similarly, in some cases on 
which Judge Fletcher has sat, some judges’ votes could be viewed as fitting such patterns, 
but counterexamples abound. This essay, which focuses on the work of one judge and does 
not systematically compare votes of judges from different parts of the political spectrum, 
cannot claim to disprove the political view; but that view finds little if any support in Judge 
Fletcher’s cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes you think of a title that may be too cute, or is at least 
catchy enough that you have to come up with an article to go with it. My 
title, All Rise! Standing in Judge Betty Fletcher’s Court, may be nifty 
but could also be somewhat misleading, because I’ve tried to look at all 
the cases heard by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher that 
deal with constitutional and prudential justiciability issues.1 Thus, the 
                                                   
*Elvin R. Latty Professor Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. Full disclosure: Senior Ninth 
Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher, the honoree of this symposium, is my mother-in-law. My wife, 
Susan Fletcher French, is Judge Fletcher’s eldest child and a professor on the faculty of the UCLA 
School of Law. 
1. My search in the Ninth Circuit database on Westlaw was extremely broad—“Fletcher & 
(justiciab! standing moot! ripe! unripe! “political question”)” with a date restriction to exclude years 
before she went on the bench. The search produced jst over 2,000 hits, most of them minor or 
irrelevant, as of January 2, 2010. I clicked on all. It’s fortunate that I don’t seem to be subject to 
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coverage here of this significant and interesting area includes not only 
standing but also political questions, ripeness, and mootness.2 
Nonetheless, the majority of cases deal with standing. I concentrate on 
decisions in which she has written for the court or separately, while also 
looking at some in which she has just joined others’ opinions. Since 
Judge Fletcher has been on the Ninth Circuit for three decades, coverage 
is necessarily selective; I have tried to pick out her most important 
justiciability cases and to identify patterns about which some 
generalization may be possible, and also areas in which it does not 
appear that her decisions fit with what might have been a predicted 
pattern. 
Justiciability is not a field in which one might expect a federal 
appellate judge to develop in a major way her own distinctive 
jurisprudence. In contrast to some other areas, such as environmental 
law,3 the Supreme Court has left few if any broad justiciability questions 
of first impression unaddressed. Thus to a considerabl  extent this essay 
looks not at Judge Fletcher’s contributions to the field but rather, 
through the work of one experienced and distinguished intermediate-
court judge, at how the Supreme Court’s justiciabilty doctrines work in 
application. I have taught these doctrines on a top-down basis in Federal 
Courts class for decades, and so this essay in part reflects a testing of my 
own impressions and key points that I have been teaching. It discusses 
not so much what Judge Fletcher has done, but rather w at one 
                                                   
carpal-tunnel syndrome. 
One somewhat amusing result of my Westlaw search is a candidate for inclusion in that well-
known social-science publication—the Journal of Insignificant Findings: Judge Fletcher is fond of 
the expression “standing alone,” in the sense that some factor by itself is not enough to compel thus-
and-such a conclusion. See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (B. 
Fletcher, J.) (“[F]ormation of a contract with a nonresident defendant is not, standing alone, 
sufficient to create jurisdiction.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009); Pierce v. 
County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir.) (B. Fletcher, J.) (“[A] detainee’s placement in 
administrative segregation does not, standing alone, justify a complete denial of opportunities to 
practice religion.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 597 (2008). That phrase caused a large 
number of false hits in my database search. 
2. Cases on “statutory standing” are excluded from this essay’s coverage because, despite the 
label, they really tend to be about whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under the relevant statute. 
See, e.g., Vaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (B. Fletcher, J.) 
(“[A] dismissal for lack of statutory standing is pro erly viewed as a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Criminal or habeas cases 
involving issues of standing to object to allegedly illegal searches, which are usually fairly routine, 
and ripeness in takings cases, a specialized area, r  lso excluded. 
3.  See Kenneth S. Weiner, The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Jurispudence of 
Ninth Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher: A Trustee of the Environment and Woman of Substance, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 45 (2010). 
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experienced Federal Courts teacher has learned on the subject through 
surveying her justiciability cases. 
Part I develops as a point of departure the well-argued thesis from a 
significant article on standing (which might apply also to other 
justiciability doctrines): that case outcomes seem to be more determined 
by judges’ apparent political leanings than by articulated doctrines.4 Part 
II looks at Judge Fletcher’s record on review and repo ts finding no 
reversals of justiciability opinions she has written, and just one reversal 
of a justiciability opinion that she has joined. Part III returns to the 
justiciability-as-politics issue, looking for ideological division in panels 
on which Judge Fletcher has served. It finds some evidence, but not 
much, of such division, with some non-ideological split  as well. Part IV 
takes up another aspect of the same issue, hunting for judicial tendencies 
to find justiciability in cases involving possibly sympathetic merits 
claims and the reverse. Again, some cases that could fit such a pattern do 
appear, but there are many counterexamples. 
I.  STANDING: LAW OR POLITICS? 
While Federal Courts professors teach standard justiciability 
doctrines, many of us also acknowledge that the area is often regarded as 
a quite politicized and manipulable corner of the law. The Federal 
Courts casebook that I co-author5 reproduces extracts from a significant 
1999 article by Professor Richard Pierce of the George Washington law 
faculty.6 Based on several then-recent Supreme Court cases on standing 
generally, plus a significant number of court of appeals standing 
decisions in environmental cases, Professor Pierce r luctantly concluded 
that doctrine was less useful in predicting votes than a political-science 
view based on ideology, apparently as indicated by the party of the 
President who had appointed a justice or circuit judge.7 In five Supreme 
Court cases, a “political scientist with no knowledg  of the law of 
standing would have had no difficulty predicting the outcome of each 
case and predicting thirty-one of the thirty-three votes cast by Justices 
with clear ideological preferences . . . .”8 
                                                   
4. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999). 
5. HOWARD P. FINK  ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007). 
6. Pierce, supra note 4, quoted in FINK  ET AL., supra note 5, at 102–04. 
7. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1744 (referring to “Republican judges” and “Democratic judges”). 
8. Id. at 1754–55. 
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It is not just that liberals generally favored broad standing while 
conservatives were for narrower approaches: conservatives favored 
standing for banks while liberals usually did not, and the votes were 
reversed when it came to standing for prisoners, employees, and 
environmentalists.9 I had sometimes thought, and suggested to my 
students, that voting patterns would be considerably less ideological in 
lower courts, which are supposed to be applying the Supreme Court’s 
teachings. But Pierce reports that in thirty-three appellate environmental-
standing cases in the middle 1990s, Republican appointees voted against 
standing 43.5% of the time and Democratic ones only 11.1%.10 As 
Pierce summed up, “I can teach the doctrines . . . only as a vocabulary 
lesson. The doctrinal elements of standing are nearly worthless as a basis 
for predicting whether a judge will grant individuals with differing 
interests access to the courts.”11 
II.  JUDGE FLETCHER’S RECORD ON REVIEW 
To proceed, then, with findings, both some that relate to Pierce’s 
claims and others that do not: First, as best I could find, no court opinion 
that Judge Fletcher has written on justiciability has been reversed by 
either the en banc Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court, nor has a case in 
which she dissented on a justiciability issue been upheld on further 
review (which, of course, often did not take place). The Supreme Court 
has reversed her, of course, including in cases in which she wrote on 
justiciability issues—but in those cases, it did so on the merits. A 
prominent recent example is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Winter,12 in which the Ninth Circuit found no mootness bar to 
environmental organizations’ challenge to the Navy’s use of sonar in 
ways that might injure marine mammals13 and went on to impose 
conditions on the sonar use.14 The Supreme Court reversed those 
conditions that the Navy challenged, but the majority’s opinion dealt 
with the merits and did not mention mootness issues.15 
                                                   
9. Id. at 1755. 
10. Id. at 1759–60. 
11. Id. at 1743. 
12. 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.) (B. Fletcher, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365 
(2008). 
13. Id. at 678–79. 
14. Id. at 687–703. 
15. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
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I have found only one case in which Judge Fletcher joined a 
prevailing opinion on a justiciability matter that the Supreme Court 
effectively reversed, and that case presents an interesting twist because 
the panel denied standing and the Supreme Court vacated in light of a
contrary decision in another case. She and Judge Ferdinand Fernandez16 
joined Judge Warren Ferguson’s opinion in Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,17 
finding no standing in an employer’s challenge to a former female 
employee’s use at trial of peremptory strikes against men to produce an 
all-female jury.18 Some months later the Supreme Court decided 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,19 upholding a civil litigant’s third-
party standing to raise excluded jurors’ claims of race-based peremptory 
challenges,20 and then vacated and remanded Dias for further 
consideration in light of Edmonson.21 For someone who has spent thirty 
years serving in an often-reversed circuit, this single vacation in a 
justiciability case seems not a bad record. 
III.  THE IDEOLOGICAL-DIVISION PATTERN IS MIXED 
More significant for present purposes than whether Judge Fletcher has 
a good batting average would be whether any sort of ideological pattern, 
of the sort Professor Pierce reported, can be found in her justiciability 
cases. Two major caveats are in order here. First, one sometimes 
encounters—especially among students—suspicions of hidden agendas 
in justiciability votes, with judges reaching to find justiciability when 
they are sympathetic to a claim on its merits and voting against 
justiciability when they want to avoid decision, or are unsympathetic, on 
the merits. Such motive-imputing deserves skepticism because it 
involves rank speculation (and it seems especially questionable at the 
Supreme Court level because the Court can avoid decision by denying 
                                                   
16. Judges referred to by name only are Ninth Circuit judges. 
17. 919 F.2d 1370, 1380 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). The 
unanimous panel can be presumed to be somewhat ideologically diverse, with Judges Ferguson and 
Fletcher being Carter appointees and Judge Fernandez having been appointed by President George 
H.W. Bush. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, The Judges of this Court in Order 
of Seniority, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority_list.php?pk_id=0000000035  
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009); Federal Judicial Center, Ferguson, Warren John, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). Information on judges sitting 
on Ninth Circuit panels by designation comes from Googling them, from other courts’ websites, or 
from Westlaw’s Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (AFJ) database. 
18. Dias, 919 F.3d at 1377–80. 
19. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
20. Id. at 629–30. 
21. Sky Chefs, Inc. v. Dias, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991) (mem.). 
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certiorari). The second caveat is that this essay does not attempt the sort 
of comparative and statistical analysis that Professor Pierce offered; it 
focuses on one judge without trying to compare the work of others. So 
what I can offer are several prominent examples, which seem to present 
a mixed picture that defies easy generalization, that relate to patterns one 
might look for in justiciability decisions. 
One question would be whether the cases show any tendency toward 
ideological division. The answer is multifaceted. Of course, some cases 
involved what could be viewed as ideological splits. Judge Fletcher 
recently joined fellow Carter appointee Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s 
opinion in D’Lil v. Best Western Encino Lodge & Suites,22 upholding the 
standing of a disabled person who had filed many previous claims under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act23 to pursue a particular claim. In this 
case, the majority found that the plaintiff had shown enough of a 
likelihood that she would use the specific facility again.24 Judge Pamela 
Rymer, appointed by the first President Bush, dissented, faulting the 
majority for giving too little deference to the distr ct judge’s findings 
and too little weight to the plaintiff’s pattern ofsuing other businesses 
whose facilities she did not go back and use.25 Similarly, in Hemp 
Industry Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration,26 Judge 
Fletcher wrote for the majority, with fellow Carter appointee Chief 
Judge Mary Schroeder joining her opinion, and Reagan appointee Judge 
Alex Kozinski dissenting. The majority upheld the standing of hemp 
producers to challenge a Drug Enforcement Agency rule that might 
subject them to enforcement because their products could include traces 
of the active ingredient in marijuana.27 The majority found the 
possibility of enforcement great enough for the case not to be moot,28 
and then went on to find the rule procedurally invalid.29 Judge Kozinski 
dissented on mootness, pointing to a new agency regulation that, if 
upheld, would negate the effect of the rule.30 
Although such ideological splits do arise (these were the only two I 
found), it is important to note that nearly all of the rulings I examined 
                                                   
22. 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2824 (2009). 
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
24. D’Lil , 518 F.3d at 1037–40. 
25. Id. at 1041–43 (Rymer, J., dissenting). 
26. 333 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). 
27. Id. at 1085 n.3 (mootness), 1086–87 (standing). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1091. 
30. Id. at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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are unanimous for or against justiciability, whether the panel has 
members appointed by Presidents of different parties or all by 
Democratic Presidents. Further, there are instances of patterns that do 
not seem to cut along ideological lines: splits on panels with all 
Democratic appointees, and even one decision in which Judge Fletcher 
filed a result-only, no-standing concurrence from what may best be 
characterized as the conservative side in a civil-rights case. 
West v. Secretary of Transportation31 finds Judge Fletcher writing for 
the panel majority, joined by fellow Carter appointee Judge Reinhardt, 
with Clinton appointee Judge Sidney Thomas dissenting from their no-
mootness holding. For the majority, completion of the first stage of a 
highway interchange did not moot a challenge that claimed the Federal 
Highway Administration improperly exempted the stage from review 
under the National Environmental Policy Act32 and sought a preliminary 
injunction against construction.33 Judge Fletcher’s opinion viewed some 
forms of relief, such as use restrictions, structural changes, and even 
removal or closure of the interchange, as conceivable nd reason enough 
to save the challenge from being moot.34 Judge Thomas’s dissent 
focused on the relief sought—a preliminary injunction against 
construction in order to prevent environmental damage—and argued that 
it was mooted by the construction and use of the interchange.35 
The decision in which Judge Fletcher seemed to be concurring from 
the right in a civil-rights case is Nava v. City of Dublin,36 a son’s suit for 
his father’s death from a police carotid hold.37 Carter appointee Judge 
Otto Skopil followed Ninth Circuit precedent, with apparent reluctance, 
to find that the son had standing to seek a permanent injunction 
restricting use of the hold, and was joined by District Judge John 
Rhoades of Arizona, a Reagan appointee sitting by designation.38 The 
majority went on to reverse the issuance of the injunction on the 
merits.39 Judge Fletcher specially concurred in the result only, writing 
that she could not reconcile the Ninth Circuit’s precedents with the 
                                                   
31. 206 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000). 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
33. West, 206 F.3d at 924–26. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 931–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
36. 121 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1997). 
37. Id. at 454. 
38. Id. at 455–58. 
39. Id. at 458. 
Rowe DTPed (2).doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:15 PM 
26 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:19 
 
Supreme Court’s notorious decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,40 
which denied standing to a chokehold survivor to seek injunctive relief 
against the practice because of the unlikelihood of his being subjected to 
it again.41 She thus agreed that the injunction should be vacated, 
although for lack of standing rather than on the merits, and called 
unsuccessfully for en banc review of the post-Lyons precedents the 
majority had followed.42 The signs of ideological division left by these 
significant example cases seem decidedly mixed. 
IV.  JUDGE FLETCHER’S RECORD ON REACHING 
“CONGENIAL” SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS IS ALSO MIXED 
Aside from the possibility of an ideological split, another metric one 
could infer from Pierce’s arguments is whether judges tend to find 
justiciability when they might be expected to be sympathetic to a claim 
on its merits, and the converse.43 Judge Fletcher, described in a recent 
newspaper article as “the Ninth Circuit’s Lion of Liberalism,”44 might, if 
that label is at least somewhat accurate, be predicted to find justiciability 
for and uphold civil-rights and environmental claims, for example, and 
avoid claims such as challenges to affirmative-action programs. If there 
is any regularity in her decisions and votes in this respect, I have not 
found it. For every significant example of such tend cies—and there 
are some—other decisions do not seem to support the hypothesis. 
In two affirmative-action cases the challengers lost both times—once 
on standing, and once on the merits. In Scott v. Pasadena Unified School 
District,45 she wrote for a unanimous panel of all-Democratic ppointees 
in finding no standing or ripeness in a challenge by parents to the 
district’s lottery plan for admission to voluntary “magnet” schools.46 The 
plaintiffs pointed to a racial factor in the plan as the basis for their equal-
protection claim, but the court found the factor insufficient to find 
justiciability because it had not been invoked in the actual case and 
might not be used in the future.47 But in Associated General Contractors 
                                                   
40. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
41. Id. at 105–06. 
42. Nava, 121 F.3d at 460 (B. Fletcher, J., specially concurring). 
43. Actually, such an articulation seems too crude: a judge so operating, whether consciously or 
subconsciously, might also be expected to lean toward finding justiciability if he were sympathetic 
to a defense that he would like to see recognized as valid. 
44. SEATTLE WEEKLY, Aug. 19–25, 2009, front cover. 
45. 306 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2002). 
46. Id. at 648–49, 663–64. 
47. Id. at 653–61. 
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of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Economic Equity,48 she wrote the 
majority opinion finding associational standing in a challenge to a 
municipal minority-business-enterprise ordinance,49 and upholding the 
denial of a preliminary injunction for lack of a showing of likely success 
on the merits.50 Reagan appointee Judge David Thompson joined her 
opinion, and Reagan appointee Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain concurred 
specially on the merits without addressing the standing issue.51 
If “conservative” affirmative-action challengers lost in these two 
examples, Judge Fletcher has not been a consistent vote for often 
“liberal” environmentalists in cases involving standing issues. In one 
significant case, she joined an opinion by Clinton appointee Judge 
Ronald Gould finding no standing for an environmental group in a 
challenge to Environmental Protection Agency action  water 
projects.52 By contrast, in a case involving a claim that EPA action was 
too rigorous rather than too lax, she joined Nixon appointee Judge 
Alfred Goodwin’s opinion upholding standing for a water-conservation 
district and irrigation districts on their claims against an emission 
restriction;53 the unanimous panel then upheld the restriction on the 
merits.54 
I could give many more examples of the diverse pattern, or lack 
thereof, that I see, but will limit myself to just a few. Wasson v. Sonoma 
County Junior College55 involved a teacher’s challenge to her threatened 
discharge, based on anonymous speech she denied authoring but was 
found to have written.56 The majority opinion, written by Carter 
appointee Judge Mary Schroeder and joined by Reagan ppointee Judge 
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, viewed the case as involving third-party standing 
and held that the plaintiff lacked standing to defend the First 
Amendment rights of the anonymous author.57 Judge Fletcher dissented, 
characterizing the right claimed as the teacher’s “ight not to be 
                                                   
48. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). 
49. Id. at 1405–09. 
50. Id. at 1418. 
51. Id. at 1418–19 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring). 
52. Rattlesnake Coalition v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007). The third member of the 
unanimous panel was George H.W. Bush appointee Judge Andrew Kleinfeld. 
53. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1533 (9th Cir. 1991). The third 
panel member was Third Circuit Judge Ruggero Aldisert, a Johnson appointee sitting by 
designation. 
54. Id. 
55. 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000). 
56. Id. at 661. 
57. Id. at 663. 
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retaliated against for speech she either made anonym usly or did not 
make at all” and regarding that as sufficient to support standing.58 She 
went on to express views favorable to the plaintiff’s claim, based on 
Supreme Court anonymous-speech precedents.59 Here, then, is a case 
involving a favorable view on standing coupled with apparent sympathy 
with the claim on the merits. Similarly, her opinio for an ideologically 
diverse and (rare) unanimous en banc court in American Jewish 
Congress v. City of Beverly Hills60 upheld both standing61 and an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a menorah erected by a private group 
in a city park.62 
But there are also cases involving claims by liberals in which Judge 
Fletcher found no standing. A leading example is Dellums v. United 
States,63 in which she wrote for a unanimous panel of Democrati  
appointees.64 The district court had found standing and ruled on the 
merits for citizens seeking to compel the Attorney General to investigate 
whether President Reagan and other federal officials h d violated the 
Neutrality Act65 by their actions with respect to the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua.66 Judge Fletcher’s opinion reversed on 
standing grounds.67 Another case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. State 
Energy Resources & Conservation & Development Corp.,68 resents, for 
those who might be inclined to find pure politics in standing rulings, a 
backwards picture. Judge Fletcher69 found standing for utility companies 
but not for an employee who claimed to have lost hi job as a result of a 
challenged state regulation imposing a moratorium on the building of 
new nuclear-power plants.70 She went on to find no preemption of the 
                                                   
58. Id. at 664 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. 
60. 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
61. Id. at 381–82. 
62. Id. at 386. 
63. 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986). 
64. Joining her opinion were Judge William Canby, a C rter appointee, and Seventh Circuit 
Judge Thomas Fairchild, a Johnson appointee sitting by designation. 
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2006). 
66. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 819. 
67. Id. at 821–23. 
68. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
69. Ford appointee District Judge James Fitzgerald of Alaska, sitting by designation, joined Judge 
Fletcher’s opinion. Carter appointee Judge Warren Frguson agreed with the majority on its 
standing rulings, id. at 928, while concurring separately on the merits, id. at 928–31. 
70. Id. at 914–15. 
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state regulation by federal law.71 The finding of standing for the direct 
target of regulation, but not for those more incidentally and indirectly 
affected by the regulation, is consistent with what t e Supreme Court has 
since said about standing.72 
Further on the subject of reaching or not reaching the merits, two 
political-question decisions provide a nice final contrast. A finding of 
political-question nonjusticiability, in contrast to many no-standing 
rulings, means that no one can bring a challenge to a disputed 
government action; the subject is off limits for the courts. Standing 
denials, by contrast, often leave it possible for some other challenger to 
bring suit against the government position in question: the issue is not 
whether there can be any challenger, but who that cllenger may be.73 
Probably Judge Fletcher’s most significant political-question opinion is 
the one she wrote for a unanimous, ideologically diverse panel when 
sitting by designation in the Eleventh Circuit. Made in the USA 
Foundation v. United States74 involved a challenge by unions and a 
nonprofit group to the constitutionality of the mode of enactment of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),75 which had not gone 
through the treaty-ratification process with its requirement of a two-
thirds vote in the Senate but had been adopted instead by majority vote 
in both Houses of Congress.76 The district court found standing and no 
political-question barrier and upheld NAFTA’s adopti n on the merits.77 
Judge Fletcher’s opinion agreed that the plaintiffs had standing78 but 
found several reasons for political-question nonjusticiability: a strong 
                                                   
71. Id. at 919–28. 
72. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–2 (1992) (Scalia, J.): 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and 
extent of facts that must be averred . . . in order to establish standing depends considerably 
upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he 
is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a 
judgment preventing or requiring the action will red ss it. When, however, . . . a plaintiff’s 
asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.  
Id. 
73. Some rulings against standing, however, do have the effect of eliminating all possible 
challengers and leaving the matter to the political process. “The assumption that if respondents have 
no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.” Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (19 4). 
74. 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). The other panel members were Ford appointee Judge Gerald 
Tjoflat and Clinton appointee Judge Charles Wilson. 
75. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057. 
76. Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1303 & n.4. 
77. Id. at 1302. 
78. Id. 
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textual commitment to the political branches of theconduct of foreign 
affairs, judicial unsuitability for making the kind of political judgments 
that would be involved, and strong prudential reasons for judicial non-
involvement.79 One can imagine the judges’ relief at not having to 
decide whether NAFTA had been constitutionally adopted, but the case 
does seem like a strong one for application of the political-question 
doctrine. 
Judge Fletcher’s other significant political-question decision went the 
other way on a challenge to revenue legislation under the Constitution’s 
clause requiring that bills to raise revenue must originate in the House of 
Representatives.80 In Armstrong v. United States,81 she wrote for herself 
and fellow Carter appointee Judge Stephen Reinhardt82 that a taxpayer 
seeking a refund of an excise tax imposed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 198283 was not barred on political-question 
grounds from doing so,84 but that the Senate’s complete replacement of 
all but the enacting clause of the House bill did not violate the 
origination clause.85 Five years later the Supreme Court, in a decision 
unanimous as to outcome, upheld her position on the justiciability of 
origination-clause claims.86 
CONCLUSION 
The very mixed picture on justiciability decisions that emerges from 
this survey cannot by itself be taken as disproving Professor Pierce’s 
findings about relative political predictability of judges’ leanings on 
such issues.87 Again, it would take comparative work of the sort not 
done here to test his findings in a different group of cases. But to the 
extent that someone might be tempted to make fairly crude political 
predictions about Judge Fletcher’s likely positions in justiciability cases, 
one would be justified in asking, “How many counterexamples do you 
want?” 
                                                   
79. Id. at 1311–20. 
80. “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. art. I. § 7, cl.1. 
81. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985). 
82. The third judge died after argument. Id. at 1379. 
83. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codifie as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
84. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1380. 
85. Id. at 1380–82. 
86. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387 (1990). 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11. 
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* * * 
I have saved for last a development with special Fletcher family 
overtones. Earlier this essay described Nava v. City of Dublin, in which 
Judge Fletcher concurred specially on the ground that s e could not 
reconcile a Supreme Court case limiting standing with Ninth Circuit 
precedent that had interpreted that case as allowing standing in limited 
circumstances.88 Her call for en banc consideration went unheeded at the 
time, but within three years the court took an en ba c case raising the 
same issue.89 In the meantime, Judge Fletcher had assumed senior status 
(although she remains fully active over ten years lter); and her son 
Willy Fletcher, nominated by President Clinton, had t ken a seat on the 
court in late 1998. Not only did the court vindicate her position and 
overrule Nava and its predecessors,90 but it did so in a virtually 
unanimous opinion91 for an ideologically diverse eleven-judge panel—
with a reference to her Nava concurrence92 and with Judge Willy 
Fletcher, author of the lead article in this symposium,93 writing his 
maiden en banc opinion for the court.94 
 
                                                   
88. 121 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1997). See supra text accompanying notes 36–42. 
89. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9thCir. 1999) (en banc). 
90. Id. at 1040 n.1. 
91. See id. at 1045 (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring) (“I . . . concur in the court’s opinion. I 
write separately, however, in order to disassociate myself from some of the opinion’s dicta . . . .”).
92. Id. at 1040 n.1. 
93.  William A. Fletcher, Tribute to Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
94. See Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1038. 
